Not seen since the days of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, the age of phrenetic shuttle diplomacy has returned with Donald Trump and Steve Witkoff.

Witkoff, the President’s Chief negotiator, is shuttling to the Middle East, where he handles Iranian and Hamas discussions, and to Moscow for talks on Ukraine. Like Kissinger in 1970-72, he is considered the administration’s top point man for foreign policy. Indeed, he has outstripped Marco Rubio in having Trump’s confidence. And Witkoff has gone Kissinger one better. While Kissinger still held the National Security Council Advisor position, Witkoff held the modest position of Special Assistant to the President. Trump’s National Security Director, Michael Waltz, is in the dog house while Witkoff is in the lead as the President’s foreign policy spokesperson.

Again, the whole approach is very Nixonian in style and confusion. During the Vietnam War, Secretary of State William P. Rogers did not handle the negotiations in Paris; Kissinger did. Indeed, the NSC Director usurped Roger’s authority with Nixon’s approval. However, Rogers, not Kissinger, given his position as Secretary of State, signed the Paris Accord, although he did not negotiate the deal. Rogers also did not play a major role in the USSR and Communist Chinese “detente” in 1971-72. Perhaps that is why Kissinger became Secretary of State in 1973.

However, Kissinger had problems with Nixon when it came to Saigon. The President had a weak spot for South Vietnam. Kissinger wanted a “decent interval” but had no faith in Saigon. It mirrors the differences between Rubio and Witkoff in Ukraine.

The big difference between Nixon and Trump is that Trump has very little sympathy for Ukraine, unlike Nixon with South Vietnam. The President is a student of Kissinger’s style of diplomacy; indeed, Trump was very friendly with the old Secretary of State. Indeed, one suspects that Trump likes the concept of bigger powers cooperating for mutual benefit and conceding spheres of influence, where particular areas are conceded to other powers for concessions to the United States. To say the least, this is “old world diplomacy.”

There are dangers in this approach. Ultimately, Nixon ran into domestic difficulties that undermined his foreign policy. In 1973, the Paris Agreement allowed North Vietnam to stay in the South, the so-called cease-fire in place. President Gerald R. Ford, having replaced Nixon after his resignation in August 1974, did not re-enter the war after the North had launched its final offensive. In December 1971, with Kissinger eager to open up China to negotiation, backed Pakistan over India during the Bangladesh War. India won a resounding victory, and the US had egg all over its face.

Kissinger was obsessed with leaks, as was Nixon. However, unlike Trump, Nixon did not have an X to broadcast his every impression to the world. Witkoff was on the Waltz signal group chat with Jeffrey Goldberg, a reporter; Kissinger simply used the back channels and gave information to journalists. The Kissinger approach is back in all its glory.