Donald Trump’s tariff policy startled world stock markets and threw financial institutions into turmoil. It represented a considerable gamble, but it should not have been unexpected. Trump has been, since 1987, an opponent of globalization, seeing it as a threat to both producers and workers. As with Ross Perot in 1992, Trump foresaw the “great sucking sound” with the advent of NAFTA.

The only question that should bother Trump’s advisors is whether the President had waited too long to introduce them. Many years have passed since “the new world order” economically went into effect. China was a minor player in the 1980s, with most protectionists reserving their wrath for Japan. A global network has since emerged, including the World Trade Organization, the G-20, and the G-7 countries’ economic unions. Opting for full-throttle protectionism appears an anachronism.

But free traders have much to answer for, particularly the industrial areas of the Mid-West, once the leader in manufacturing, suddenly were referred to as the “the rust belt”. However, not all their woes were related to free trade. Some were rooted in older issues, primarily environmental and labor issues. Even with considerable tariffs in the 1970s, Germany and Japan increased their market share in the US. In the 1960s, at the beginning of the decade, foreign cars were only 4% of the market, but they were 17% at its end. By 1980, market share had increased to over a third and other products from abroad matched this rate. Mind you, this was when tariffs were in place.

More significantly a “sucking sound” had already happened internally in the United States. Textile firms moved from New England to the South, where organized labor was weaker and wages were lower. By the time some improvements were made, these firms had already moved further south and, over time, to Asia. American workers seek protection but also prefer representation and safe working conditions. Has Trump figured this into the discussion? During the heyday of protectionism in 1900-1930, jobs were shielded from foreign competition, but other considerations, from union representation to quality of life, were nothing like what Americans have come to expect.

Also, American productivity has increased since the 1970s and 1980s. The economy is more high-tech and information-driven, and inflation has increased wage expectations. The hard hat that Trump loves to immortalize is not seen so much in factories but on construction sites. Manufacturing is run by technological innovation, which stresses artificial intelligence and fewer workers. Moreover, the burley steelworkers of the past have been replaced by a more managerial workforce.

Trump was not wrong to question the social damage caused by globalization. Many small firms left their communities or went out of business, leaving hollowed-out towns. But other businesses, such as craft beer breweries and tourist-related enterprises, picked up the slack. True enough, they did not fully replace what was lost. However, with global dislocation, one must consider what damage might be done to these newer enterprises.