Donald Trump’s decision to ditch the name of the Department of Defense and call it the War Department is not as strange as it is made out to be.

It is simply reverting to its old name, which dates back to August 7, 1789. It was changed by the National Security Act of 1947, which assigned it to the Defense Department. It also created the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency.

Established as a means of unifying all branches of security, the measure was sold as an efficiency move. However, over time, it became more corporate in its approach and mission.

It is proper to note that James Forrestal was a key partner in the financial firm of Dillon Read. Many leaders transitioned from business to military careers. Robert McNamara came out of the Ford Motor Company during his service in the Kennedy and John administrations.

The emphasis was on coordination among the service branches, including the Navy, the Army, and the newly established Air Force branch in 1947. Previously, the air wings were incorporated into the individual services.

Over the years, the department had become reminiscent of the “military-industrial complex,” which President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned America about in January 1961.

Current Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth complained that the warrior spirit of the armed forces had been diluted by the bureaucratic and businesslike Pentagon. It is notable that the first Secretary of War, Henry Knox, was a commander in the Continental Army during the Revolution. Hegseth desires that the military spirit should replace the country house quality of the Defense Department, and he is not wrong.

During the Cold War, the “unity of command” idea was originally seen as a move towards efficiency and was subsequently expanded upon. In South Korea and South Vietnam, nation-building with a sociological bent, such as “winning hearts and minds,” diluted the prime military function of defeating the enemy, or so some like Hegseth believe. Indeed, some of the titles for missions seem less than robust.

Instead of theaters of conflict, suddenly you had MAAG’s, military assistance advisory groups, or the upgraded MACV. The case of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam is chock-full of rhetorical sterility. Indeed, the defense jargon came dangerously close to incorporating corporate terms such as collaboration or teamwork.

Certainly, you need those to succeed, but given that you risk your life in the military, something more substantial is required. The Emperor Napoleon I once opined that it is with “baubles that men are led.” That is indeed a different culture. Now, Hegseth will have to consider how to reshuffle the responsibilities, but his concerns do not lack merit.